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Chen

24 February 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Hal Sonnenfeldt Comments on NIE 13/11-84 (Draft of 22 February 1984)

1. He has no major problems with the paper. He calls it a "conservative" one in its judgments, but says that he shares its view that more extreme prospects for Sino-Soviet relations over the next two-three years are quite unlikely.

(9+ does) → 2. He notes that the Key Judgments address the estimated future number of Soviet SS-20 warheads in Siberia, but that the text needs to back that up. He suggests that we also check to see if there is any evidence that the Soviets intend to deploy any of their newer SS missiles in Siberia.

3. He suggests that we point out to the readers that Soviet policy toward China was supposed to become more active under Andropov but didn't. Why?

4. He agrees that substantially improved Sino-Soviet relations are not likely, but recommends that we treat the off-chance prospect a little more fully because of the consequences such a future would have for US interests.

5. He suggests that in view of the President's upcoming trip to China we highlight a bit more what would be the likely effect on Soviet policy toward China and the US of a demonstrated warming of Sino-US relations. He reminds us that the Soviets signed detente and SALT I with us soon after the Nixon breakthrough to China.

6. We should highlight Korea more, since it is the one place where there could be a real clash of arms in the area. Also it is an ongoing place for Sino-Soviet competition; this could become especially important if both Moscow and Beijing had to demonstrate loyalty to Kim after he had taken some especially assertive step in Korea.

7. The NIE should note that there is an upgrading of the level of diplomatic representation in the Sino-Soviet talks.

H.
Hal Ford
NIO At Large

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